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THE IMPACT OF THE SUPERVISORY BOARD ON SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN VIETNAMESE LISTED BANKS

Abstract

Sustainability reporting is a vital tool for businesses to present their activities and achievements in implementing sustainable development. It strengthens supervision and accountability to ensure information transparency in the banking industry. This study aims to examine the impact of the supervisory board on sustainability reporting in Vietnamese listed banks. Utilizing panel data from 2017 to 2024, the study assesses the period during which these banks brought about positive changes in economic integration. Secondary data from annual reports and financial statements of all listed banks in Vietnam are employed. The study employs quantitative methods to investigate the relationship between the supervisory board and sustainability reporting, using a feasible generalized least squares estimation technique to test the research hypotheses. The findings provide valuable insights for stakeholders to understand the supervisory board's positive influence on sustainability reporting in the banking industry. Furthermore, the study supports practical implications for bank administrators in planning to enhance the monitoring board's effectiveness in controlling information quality, promoting increased disclosure of sustainability information to foster stakeholder confidence, and attracting investment capital for economic growth in the banking sector. The study contributes to creating opportunities for community benefits to raise awareness of stakeholders about the environment and social responsibility for sustainable development in the context of global economic integration.

Keywords

environment, community, social responsibility,
information disclosure, sustainability development

JEL Classification

G21, Q01, M14, M41

INTRODUCTION

Sustainability reporting (abbreviated as a report) usually focuses on three main issues: economic, environmental, and social. The report provides transparent information about the activities, achievements, and challenges of businesses. The main role of information is to increase the relevance of business activities. The report supports the evaluation of a company's performance in implementing sustainable development. The report provides useful information for investors, customers, and other stakeholders in making decisions (Bowen, 1953; Carroll, 1999). Accordingly, the report supports businesses in increasing social and environmental responsibilities. It helps improve the image of companies in the eyes of stakeholders and helps firms increase competitiveness by demonstrating their commitment to sustainable development. Stakeholders, including investors, customers, and communities, increasingly demand information about sustainable development (Sobhani et al., 2012; Akter et al., 2018; Buallay & Al-Ajmi, 2020; Alhamami, 2023).

An important responsibility of an enterprise is the control role of the supervisory board (abbreviated as a board). The board plays an important role in ensuring the transparency and accountability of the report.

It can positively influence the quality and relevance of the report when the entity is concerned about sustainability and effectively monitors the implementation of the sustainability strategy (Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2022). Accordingly, the board determines the sustainability strategy of the banking sector, including the determination of sustainability goals and targets. The board monitors the implementation of the sustainability strategy, including ensuring that the report is presented accurately and transparently. The board determines the resources needed to implement the sustainability strategy, including the allocation of resources to sustainability activities (Nugoroho et al., 2022). The board facilitates a corporate culture that supports sustainable development, including encouraging employees to participate in sustainable development activities. The board ensures transparency and accountability of the banking sector in presenting the report (Arifin et al., 2021; Rukmana et al., 2023).

The board can enhance the transparency of the report by ensuring that information is presented accurately and completely. The board can improve the quality of the report by requiring specific and detailed information on sustainability activities. The board can enhance the accountability of the banking sector in implementing sustainable development by monitoring and controlling the implementation of sustainability strategies (Jizi et al., 2014). However, the board does not pay sufficient attention to sustainable development, and the report may not be presented comprehensively. In addition, the board may not allocate sufficient resources for sustainable development activities, and the report may not fully reflect the activities of the banking sector (Mehmoona & Rashid, 2014; Latif et al., 2020; Nugoroho et al., 2022). These are challenges for the banking sector where there is a need to ensure coordination and synchronization in the relationship between the board and the report to meet stakeholder needs for useful information.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

Banks are affected by supervisory issues related to the separation of ownership and control. Banks have their own characteristics that increase supervisory issues. The board aims to protect the interests of stakeholders in line with the public interest on the basis of sustainable development (Rukmana et al., 2023). Banks are closely regulated and supervised, and are responsible for establishing regulations to control business operations. The board imposes controls on the banking system (Susanto et al., 2024). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision considers the board as a set of relationships established to serve as a means of control to achieve effective supervisory mechanisms. The board helps determine how authority and responsibility are allocated and how decisions are made within the control mechanism (BCBS, 2025). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development considers the board as the mechanism established to help develop and define means of effective monitoring of the implementation of objectives (OECD, 2023). According to the Law on Credit Institutions of Vietnam, the board is the department that supervises and evaluates compliance with the provisions of law, internal regula-

tions, charter, resolutions, and decisions of the general meeting of shareholders, owners, and the board (Vietnam National Assembly, 2024).

A report is a communication tool that helps the banking sector present efforts in implementing sustainable development, including economic, environmental, and social activities. A report is the provision of information about the risks and opportunities related to the sustainable development of an entity that can reasonably be expected to affect the prospects of the entity. The report is the disclosure of important information related to sustainable development relevant to investors' decision-making (IFRS Foundation, 2025). The report is the activity of measuring, disclosing, and being accountable to internal and external stakeholders about an organization's performance towards the goal of sustainable development (GRI, 2025). The report provides comprehensive information, including three main contents on environment, society, and economy, especially disclosure on greenhouse gas emissions (Vietnam Ministry of Finance, 2020).

A report is a mechanism for communicating an organization's sustainability initiatives and results

by integrating social and environmental impacts into the organization's accountability (Susanto et al., 2024). A report is an activity that reflects transparency, stakeholder engagement, and responsible management practices. Sustainability is the way that governance structures promote consistent, credible, and meaningful disclosure of environmental and social issues (Rukmana et al., 2023). The report is rooted in a triple-bottom-line approach, assessing an organization's performance across three pillars: economic viability, environmental stewardship, and social responsibility (Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2022).

The conflict of various interests between owners (shareholders) and agents (managers) has given rise to agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory suggests that as management activities become increasingly complex, owners cannot operate the business by themselves, and hiring managers is an inevitable need. It leads to conflicts of interest between these two groups of subjects and information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is a fundamental theory that deals with the judgments made in transactions where one party has more information than the other. To reduce the negative effects of information asymmetry, parties need to come up with solutions that enhance information and create trust between parties (Akerlof, 1970). The problems of asymmetric information lead to one party having a lot of information, specifically business managers, while the stakeholders lack information or have incomplete information (Tessema, 2019). It affects decision-making because of the lack of useful information for users. Some researchers apply this theory in explaining the issues of board and report (Devi et al., 2022; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2022; Rukman et al., 2023). The entity can use board mechanisms to increase reporting information and thereby help reduce information asymmetry and reduce conflicts of interest between managers and stakeholders in the banking sector (Arifin et al., 2021). The composition of the board is to balance the information provided to users to ensure the sustainability of information disclosure. The study uses agency theory as a foundation to explain the board's mechanism in resolving conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. It is also related to reducing information asymmetry for stakeholders.

Research on board has gained attention in recent years due to the increasing importance of supervisory. For example, Hashim et al. (2015) examined the relationship between board and sustainability practices in Islamic financial institutions. In the trend of BS regulations increasingly being regulated by Basel (BCBS, 2015) and OECD (2023), studies are gradually becoming interested in this topic to examine the influence of boards on reports. Recently, researchers on this issue have been interested in previous studies (Nugroho et al., 2022; Rukman et al., 2023; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2022, 2023, 2024). In addition, most of the studies are focused on Indonesia (Arifin et al., 2021; Devi et al., 2022; Rukman et al., 2023). Some studies focus on a few countries such as Bangladesh (Sobhani et al., 2012; Akter et al., 2018), Pakistan (Mehmoona & Rashid, 2014), Saudi Arabia (Alhamami, 2023), or Malaysia (Nilasakti & Falikhatun, 2020).

Most of the board affecting reports are considered in banks (Falikhatun et al., 2020; Arifin et al., 2021; Devi et al., 2022; Rukman et al., 2023; Ardianto et al., 2024). It has an important role in monitoring the quality of information and ensuring transparency. In addition, a few companies are also concerned about the board (Afroh et al., 2025; Susanto et al., 2024). The board clearly plays the role of the banking industry, while companies focus on the role of the audit committee.

To explain the relationships between board and report, foundational theories are applied to explain issues such as agency theory between owners and managers (Arifin et al., 2021; Devi et al., 2022; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2022; Rukman et al., 2023) and information asymmetry issues (Arifin et al., 2021; Rukman et al., 2023; Ardianto et al., 2024). Some previous studies propose stakeholder theories for information of shareholders and investors (Falikhatun et al., 2020; Devi et al., 2022; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2023; Ardianto et al., 2024). These theories explain the concerns of stakeholders about the issue related to monitoring mechanisms affecting the report.

The methods used are mainly secondary data collected from the annual reports of the banks. The studies focus on some typical banks of Indonesia, while Ardianto et al. (2024) check Islamic banks from 15 countries in the Middle East and North

Africa region. Hashim et al. (2015) consider all banks from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and non-GCC countries. The studies were conducted using small samples of banks (about 20 samples) due to the small number of banks compared to companies. However, Nugroho et al. (2022) used a sample of 150 commercial banks, while Wijayanti and Setiawan (2023) considered a fairly large sample of 136 Islamic banks.

The quantitative technique is mainly used by ordinary least squares (OLS) (Falikhatun et al., 2020; Arifin et al., 2021; Devi et al., 2022; Ardianto et al., 2024). Some previous studies used a combination of some techniques, such as the fixed effects model (FEM), random effects model (REM) (Nilasakti & Falikhatun, 2020; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2023), content analysis (Nilasakti & Falikhatun, 2020), and path analysis and Sobel test (Falikhatun et al., 2020; Afroh et al., 2025).

The research results have many contents consistent with the components of the board, like the size of the board, gender of members, meetings of the board, age of board members, education of members, and independence of members affecting the report. Most studies see board size having a positive impact on the report (Falikhatun et al., 2020; Arifin et al., 2021; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2022, 2023; Ardianto et al., 2024), but some studies also indicate the opposite (Nilasakti & Falikhatun, 2020; Rukman et al., 2023). Studies show the board has no impact on the report (Arifin et al., 2021; Devi et al., 2022). Rukman et al. (2023) also find that the board's gender has an impact on the report. Studies by Arifin et al. (2021) and Rukman et al. (2023) also confirm that board meeting has an impact on the report. Rukman et al. (2023) find that members' age has a positive impact on the report.

Some previous studies of countries confirm the board's influence on reports. However, previous studies have not considered the specific characteristics of banking supervisory regulations of developing countries such as Vietnam. Vietnam has not had any studies related to the supervisory board affecting reports in the banking industry. The novelty of this study compared to previous studies is that it focuses on both the aggregate information of the board and its corresponding components, including the size of the board, independence of

members, gender of members, age of members, meetings of the board, and education of members. Based on the synthesis of previous research, the study develops some hypotheses, including: The board has a significant influence on an organization's report. It ensures the organization implements its sustainability activities effectively, transparently, and responsibly. The board is responsible for monitoring the organization's activities and ensuring that the organization implements sustainability activities effectively and transparently (Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2024). Accordingly, the board ensures the organization's report is presented transparently and accurately. The board enhances the organization's responsibility for implementing sustainable development. The board can improve the quality of the report by requesting specific and detailed information on sustainability activities (Susanto et al., 2024).

The size of the board (SIZE) is the number of members participating in the committee. The number of members can help strengthen the ability to monitor and control the implementation of the report. A larger size of the board can lead to a report ensuring the completeness of information. According to agency theory, the size of the board plays an important role in monitoring and controlling the implementation of the organization's report. Research results confirm that the size of the board affects the report (Ardianto et al., 2024; Falikhatun et al., 2020; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2023).

Independent members of the board (IND) are members who do not participate in the management of activities. These members can make decisions and assessments more objectively, without being influenced by internal factors. The independence of the board helps to enhance the ability to monitor and control the implementation of the report, minimize risks, and increase transparency. Accordingly, the independence of the board of supervisors can lead to a better quality of report. However, independence can create information asymmetry for independent outside members. This theory also explains that the independence of the board helps to minimize conflicts of interest and enhance the monitoring and control capabilities of the board of supervisors. Susanto et al. (2024) argue that the independence of the board affects the report.

The gender of the member (GEN) is the fact that women are members of the board. Women often have different perspectives on problem-solving and decision-making than men. Gender diversity on the board can help increase creativity and innovation in implementing the report. Women tend to be more concerned about social and environmental issues, so they help strengthen the report. Agency theory also explains that gender diversity on the board can enhance creativity and innovation in report implementation. Previous studies demonstrate women often have different approaches to reporting problem-solving and decision-making than men (Rukman et al., 2023; Susanto et al., 2024).

The age of members (AGE): Members of different ages may have different experiences on board. Younger board members may have newer approaches to reporting, while older board members may have more awareness and knowledge in this area. The average age of the board may affect the ability to monitor and control the implementation of the report. Rukman et al. (2023) verify that the average age of the board affects the report.

The meeting of the board (MEET): The increased number of meetings allows the board to discuss and monitor the implementation of the report more thoroughly. The board meetings help ensure that issues related to sustainable development are discussed and resolved promptly. The increased number of meetings also allows the board to monitor the progress of report implementation and make timely decisions. The number of board meetings enhances the ability to monitor and control reports. The meeting of the Board helps to make informed decisions on report-related issues. The results from previous studies demonstrate that the number of board meetings affects the report (Arifin et al., 2021; Rukman et al., 2023).

The education of the member (EDU): Members with higher education levels may have better knowledge and skills in the report. Higher education levels also help the board better understand issues related to the environment, society, and community. Accordingly, boards' education levels may affect the report. Boards' education levels help strengthen the capacity and ability to monitor and control report implementation. Higher educational attainment helps the board make clear decisions on report-related issues.

Previous research results indicate the board's educational attainment affects the report (Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2022; Nugroho et al., 2022; Rukman et al., 2023).

Previous studies analyze some discrete variables of the board that influence the report, including board size, gender, age, and meeting. In the context of the Vietnamese banking industry, this typical variable has practical significance in evaluating the information disclosure issue.

The study aims to test a comprehensive set of characteristic variables related to the board influence report in Vietnamese banks. Based on underlying theories and the evidence of previous studies, the study develops the following hypotheses:

H1: Size of the board (SIZE) influences the report of Vietnamese banks.

H2: Independence of members (IND) influences the report of Vietnamese banks.

H3: Gender of members (GEN) influences the report of Vietnamese banks.

H4: Age of members (AGE) influences the report of Vietnamese banks.

H5: Meetings of the board (MEET) influence the report of Vietnamese banks.

H6: Education of members (EDU) influences the report of Vietnamese banks.

2. METHODOLOGY

The study uses quantitative methods to test the hypotheses of the research model. The study uses regression to analyze the relationships among the variables in the model. The study uses the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to test the hypothesis. The study uses Stata 17 to process the techniques to estimate the model.

The study uses secondary data by collecting information from financial statements and annual reports of listed banks. The information is collected to ensure the completeness of all listed banks in

the period from 2017 to 2024. Currently, the number of listed banks in Vietnam is 27. However, the banks are selected on the condition that they publish financial reports. After testing, the surveyed sample is 207 listed banks. The study selects a purposeful sample of the banking industry group and ensures the completeness of all listed banks in Vietnam up to the present time.

The study inherits the previous research model to re-examine the issue of board influences on the report in Vietnamese listed banks. According to the model, the variables include six independent variables. The regression equation of the model is as follows:

$$REPORT = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot SIZE + \beta_2 \cdot IND + \beta_3 \cdot GEN + \beta_4 \cdot AGE + \beta_5 \cdot MEET + \beta_6 \cdot EDU + \varepsilon, \tag{1}$$

where the report discloses the sustainability reporting of listed banks and is measured as follows:

$$I_{ij,t} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n_j} d_{ij}}{n_j}, \tag{2}$$

where $I_{ij,t}$ – report of listed banks, $0 \leq I_j \leq 1$; d_{ij} is 1 if the item i is recorded, 0 if the item i is not recorded; n_j is the number of items of the report; t – figures from 2017 to 2024.

The six components of the board are measured by several universal formulas, namely board size is measured by the number of board members; independence of member is measured by the member who is solely responsible for supervision during the working period is 1, otherwise it is 0; gender of members is measured by the number of women in the total number of board members; the age of members is measured by the age of members undertaking supervisory duties; meeting of board is measured by the number of board meetings; and education of members is measured by the number of members with economic expertise in the total number of board members.

3. RESULTS

The respondents in Table 1 rate the level of report disclosure (REPORT) as good at over 80%, specifically 0.8316%. This indicates that listed banks paid much

attention to sustainability information presented in their annual reports over the past eight years, from 2017 to 2024. The standard deviation of REPORT is also relatively small and around 16.02%. It also confirms that there are banks that disclose the highest level of information at 90.16%, but banks disclose only 73.17%. The average board size (SIZE) is 3,208, corresponding to the maximum level of six members and the minimum level of 2 members. The standard deviation of this variable is insignificant. This level is only at a relative level compared to the current regulations of the State Bank of Vietnam. The independence of members (IND) reaches 12.79% and the standard deviation is insignificant. This shows that the members have held many different positions before ensuring the supervision work. The proportion of female members (GEN) is 32.11%, and this level is also suitable because supervision is quite stressful and takes a lot of time to focus on the work. The average age of members (AGE) is 8.34, and it indicates that the members have experience in supervision work. The meetings of the board (MEET) have an average of about eight meetings per year, and it also ensures the regulation of the State Bank of Vietnam is once a quarter. Finally, the educational level of members (EDU) is those with economic expertise, accounting for 42.96%, and reaching a fairly good level to undertake supervision work in the financial sector alongside members with in-depth expertise in supervision and inspection. It is suitable for the context of Vietnam when reconciling members with separate expertise in controlling banking activities.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

Source: Authors' output using Stata 17.

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
REPORT	207	0.8316	0.1602	0.7317	0.9016
SIZE	207	3.208	0.4062	2.0000	6.0000
IND	207	0.1279	0.0137	0.0000	1.0000
GEN	207	0.3211	0.0204	0.0000	2.0000
AGE	207	8.3496	4.0145	2.0000	12.0000
MEET	207	8.6296	7.6145	2.000	122.000
EDU	207	0.4296	0.3145	0.0000	1.0000

The data in Table 2 indicate that the correlation coefficients of the variables are strong. It is correlated with the coefficients of variation in the range 0.1076 to 0.4201. The correlations between the variables are at appropriate levels and are all below 0.8. The data do not indicate any multicollinearity in the model, so they ensure the reliability of the statistics

Table 2. Matrix of correlation coefficients

Source: Authors' output using Stata 17.

Variable	REPORT	SIZE	IND	GEN	AGE	MEET	EDU
REPORT	1.0000	–	–	–	–	–	–
SIZE	0.3608	1.0000	–	–	–	–	–
IND	–0.3625	–0.2147	1.0000	–	–	–	–
GEN	0.2104	0.4201	–0.2408	1.0000	–	–	–
AGE	–0.3046	–0.1936	0.3872	–0.2541	1.0000	–	–
MEET	0.2047	0.1507	–0.2145	0.2018	–0.1168	1.0000	–
EDU	0.3103	0.2721	0.3104	0.1672	0.2081	–0.1076	1.0000

(Nunnally & Burnstein, 1994). Most of the variables are positively correlated with the dependent variable of the report, except the independence of members (IND) and the age of the members (AGE).

According to Table 3, the results of the research model explore three variables that have a positive impact on sustainability reporting (REPORT), including the board size (SIZE), board meetings (MEET), and board member education (EDU), with a p-value less than 5%, and the board size has the highest level of influence than the rest of variables. The remaining variables are not statistically significant, such as the independence of members (IND), the gender of members (GEN), and the age of members (AGE). The results of the regression model are shown in Table 3:

$$REPORT = 0.708 + 0.407 \cdot SIZE + 0.316 \cdot MEET + 0.201 \cdot EDU + \varepsilon. \tag{3}$$

Table 3. Regression results

Source: Authors' output using Stata 17.

Variable	REPORT
SIZE	0.000000*** (0.407)
IND	0.163702*** (0.128)
GEN	0.149260 (0.204)
AGE	0.208452 0.381
MEET	0.000000*** (0.316)
EDU	0.000000*** 0.201
_cons	0.000000*** (0.708)
Wald chi2	40.12
Prob > chi2	0.000000
N	207

Note: ***, **, and * represent 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively.

To check the model for defects, the results in Table 4 affirm that all variables have a variance inflation factor (VIF), ranging from 1.04 to 1.56, and are all less than 5. This indicates that we do not have a VIF phenomenon (Hair et al., 2014). This indicates the results of the data ensure statistical significance.

Table 4. Variance inflation factor

Source: Authors' output using Stata 17.

Variable	VIF	1/VIF
SIZE	1.42	0.70422535
IND	1.13	0.88495575
GEN	1.27	0.78740157
AGE	1.56	0.64102564
MEET	1.04	0.961538
EDU	1.12	0.892857
Mean VIF	1.26	–

Table 5 concludes that the supervisory board positively affects the sustainability report (REPORT), in which the corresponding components of the board also have an impact on the board, such as the size of the board, meetings of the board, and education of members. This means accepting hypotheses H1, H5, and H6, and rejecting the corresponding hypotheses H2, H3, and H4.

Table 5. Hypotheses testing results

Source: Authors' elaboration.

Hypotheses	Results
H 1 (Size of the board – SIZE)	Meaning (accepted)
H 2 (Independence of members – IND)	No meaning (rejected)
H 3 (Gender of members – GEN)	No meaning (rejected)
H 4 (Age of members – AGE)	No meaning (rejected)
H 5 (Meeting of the board – MEET)	Meaning (accepted)
H 6 (Education of members – EDU)	Meaning (accepted)

4. DISCUSSION

The results of this study are similar to the results of previous research, such as Falikhatun et al. (2020), Devi et al. (2022), Ardianto et al. (2024), and Wijayanti and Setiawan (2024), which show that board size, board meeting, and member education influence the report in Vietnamese banks. The result is also consistent with agency theory, asymmetric information, and stakeholders related to board influence on reports in Vietnamese listed banks. These independent variables positively report.

The board has an important influence on the report of listed banks to ensure that the banking industry implements sustainable development activities effectively, transparently, and responsibly. It is the most influential variable among the variables in the model. This result is consistent with stakeholder theory that creates information asymmetry between owners and managers, and it is also consistent with some previous studies (Tessema, 2019; Wijayanti & Setiawan, 2024). It is completely consistent with the context of Vietnam, where the state is always interested in monitoring activities to control the activities of the banking sector, including the issue of information disclosure. Vietnam is a developing country, so the quality of information is important to attract capital resources for economic development. In the coming time, banks should pay more attention to improving the level of information disclosure to demonstrate their responsibility to provide full and comprehensive information to stakeholders. Moreover, the quality of information also needs to be noted so that the information becomes meaningful and practical for investors in making decisions.

Corresponding to the components of the board, like board size, board meetings, and member education, also have a positive impact on the report. This result is consistent with some previous studies (Falikhatun et al., 2020; Devi et al., 2022; Ardianto et al., 2024). This is also in line with the recent context of Vietnam's banking industry. The increase in the number of members is meaningful in contributing to the comprehensive control of information on banking activities. A large number of members will

effectively manage the supervision work. The comprehensiveness of many members will ensure the integrity of control. In the coming time, listed banks need to supplement the number of members appropriately to ensure the quality of monitoring sustainable information of the banking industry. Furthermore, the number of meetings contributes to discussing many issues to find appropriate solutions to ensure that the information provided is appropriate. It is necessary for members to meet regularly to exchange expertise. It is an opportunity for members to discuss shortcomings in supervision and propose timely solutions for timely control. In the coming time, members need to make a specific plan for regular weekly or monthly meetings to promptly handle problems in the supervision of the banking industry.

In addition, increasing the level of professional knowledge in supervision is essential. Vietnam's banking industry also responds to the general trend of strengthening regulations and supervisory standards according to international standards, so training and knowledge improvement are necessary to ensure that information is guaranteed and complete according to the common standard framework. In the coming time, when the banking industry faces many challenges in business activities related to currency, interest rates, exchange rates, etc., board members need to increase their professional qualifications. At the same time, many international regulations and frameworks are constantly updated, so board members need to be trained and educated in depth. It helps members quickly grasp professional knowledge in supervision to perform their jobs professionally.

As discussed above, the previous research results demonstrate that the board has a positive impact on the report. Accordingly, administrators of listed banks should pay attention to promoting internal resources to improve the board of the banking industry and improve information quality. This is a necessary and significant condition for creating trust and prestige in a long-term development strategy to ensure stability.

Listed banks' administrators should pay more attention to promoting the role of the board.

Through meetings of the board or important decisions, administrators need the participation of the board to have more aspects in monitoring information. Administrators should also create conditions for the board to promote its active and proactive monitoring capacity to have a timely report and timely corrective solutions. It also aims to minimize unwanted risks due to many complex business issues in the banking industry. Administrators should proactively assign tasks to delegate supervisory powers covering the bank's activities so that the board can comprehensively and fully control to promote its strengths, help manage the banking system healthily and positively, and contribute to ensuring timely and complete information.

In promoting the operation of the board, administrators should consider arranging and organizing the number of members to ensure that the scale is expanded. The expanded scale helps members to oversee many issues in operations and comprehensively control information issues. The diversi-

ty of members will help the board to divide work and responsibilities appropriately to effectively monitor the operations of the banking industry. Furthermore, administrators also pay attention to board meetings through meeting minutes as well as encourage members to actively participate in discussions, contribute, and share views and opinions so that supervision is tight. Meetings contribute to perfecting uncontrolled or newly arising issues to have timely support solutions. The synchronization and unity in the views of members will help the board promote positive effects.

Above all, board members need to be trained and fostered promptly. Administrators should care about the professional training of board members. In the integration trend, many monitoring templates are updated, and the contents are revised to improve, so attention to supporting funding for board training is necessary. It contributes to updating useful and timely information for effective monitoring according to the international standard framework.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the study is to test the supervisory board's influence on the sustainability reporting of listed banks in Vietnam. The results demonstrate that the supervisory board has a positive influence on sustainability reporting. The elements of the supervisory board, including board size, board meetings, and member education, have a positive influence on sustainability reporting, while the remaining elements, such as member independence, gender of members, and age of members, are not significant. This affirms that administrators of listed banks should pay attention to the scale and number of meetings and increase members' level of professional knowledge. This indicates that the role of internal control of a bank is decisive in the quality of information disclosure. In addition, supervision by state management agencies and listed exchanges of listed banks does not affect sustainability reporting.

The result is a useful guide for stakeholders to understand the role and significance of the supervisory board in promoting information disclosure. For this board, bank administrators should consider increasing the number of members to divide control responsibilities and ensure coverage of many aspects of information. Administrators should also consider increasing the number of meetings to exchange and discuss many issues related to enhancing both the level and quality of information on sustainability reporting to demonstrate the responsibility of the party providing complete and appropriate information. Administrators should foster professional knowledge to thoroughly understand and raise awareness to meet the information needs of stakeholders in a timely and transparent manner. All are aimed at increasing the credibility of investors to attract capital to increase economic benefits for the banking industry. It is a basis for raising awareness among stakeholders in the social community on environmental protection and social responsibility issues in relation to sustainable development.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

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