Leyla Huseynova

A high level of company bankruptcy in certain countries and a low level of profitability actualizes the need to find additional mechanisms for increasing the efficiency of their activities. One of such mechanisms is the growth of information transparency. The study deals with examining the effects of accounting information transparency on business performance on the example of construction companies in G7 countries. The transparency index was used as a parameter characterizing the level of accounting information transparency. The level of business performance was analyzed using the following indicators: value added of the construction industry, investment in the construction industry, number of construction firms, profitability of the construction industry, annual all-work construction output index, and total employees in construction firms. The dependence between the indicators was analyzed using the multiple regression analysis, Dickey-Fuller, Philips Perron, and Johansen tests. According to the results, the most vital link was between the level of accounting information transparency and the volume of investments (increased information transparency by 1 point leads to an increase in the volume of investments from 1.7% to 4.6%). At the same time, the level of accounting information transparency practically does not affect the number of employees (change by 0.1-0.2%) and added value (change by 0.1-0.3%). It was concluded that the policy of accounting information transparency should be an essential element of company strategy aimed to increase the level of its investment attractiveness and confidence of investors and consumers in its activities.

The study aims to analyze the impact of challenges and opportunities related to corruption, regulatory barriers to doing business, innovativeness of the business environment, and development of institutions and policies that ensure economic prosperity on the development of MSMEs in Central-Western Asia countries. The paper chooses seven Central-West Asian countries using Asian Development Bank statistics for 2010–2021. Based on eleven indicators of the Asian Development Bank (the absolute values and dynamics of the number of MSMEs, their employees, their contribution to GDP, financing by banks and non-banking financial institutions) and factor analysis, the composite indicator of MSMEs’ development was calculated. The highest levels of the composite indicator in 2021 were observed for Kazakhstan (1.248), Uzbekistan (1.120), and Azerbaijan (1.043), and the lowest values for the Kyrgyz Republic (0.676). Employing a panel regression analysis with time-fixed effects (for all countries), connections between composite indicators of MSMEs’ development and the Corruption Perceptions Index, Ease of Doing Business Index, Global Competitiveness Index, and Global Innovation Index were explored. The greatest impact was in 2019 – with an increase in the Corruption Perceptions Index by one unit (the higher it is, the less corruption is considered by experts), the MSME development indicator increased by 0.26 units. With an increase in the Ease of Doing Business, Global Competitiveness, and Global Innovation Indices by one unit (growth indicates deterioration of the country’s rating position), the composite indicator of MSMEs’ development decreases by 0.68, 0.69, and 0.67 units, respectively.

Type of the article: Research Article

Abstract
Ownership concentration remains a defining feature of global corporate governance, with significant implications for economic development and inequality. This study aims to analyze the determinants of corporate ownership concentration in OECD and partner countries, focusing on the interplay between macroeconomic factors and distributional dynamics. The analysis relies on a short-balanced panel of 48 countries for 2020 and 2022, using OECD’s newly published indicator of concentrated ownership and applying OLS, Fixed Effects, and Random Effects models in R Studio. The results show that GDP per capita is negatively and significantly associated with ownership concentration (RE model, β = –1.73, p < 0.01), confirming that higher development levels are linked to more dispersed ownership structures. Wealth inequality exerts a dual effect: the top 10% wealth share is negatively related to ownership concentration (β = –135.4, p < 0.05), while the top 1% wealth share is positively related (β = 58.1, p < 0.05), underscoring the reinforcing effect of elite concentration. Income inequality measures were less robust, though the FE model indicated a positive association with the top 10% income share (β = 281.1, p = 0.021) and a negative association with the top 1% income share (β = –125.5, p = 0.006). Country-specific effects revealed persistent structural deviations, with Luxembourg (+43.5), the Slovak Republic (+29.5), and Indonesia (+27.0) exhibiting systematically higher ownership concentration. At the same time, India (–32.5), South Africa (–30.4), and Japan (–29.6) consistently displayed lower levels than predicted.

Type of the article: Research Article

Abstract
The widening development gap between well-governed and poorly governed nations – highlighted by the reversal since 2020 of two decades of human development convergence – underscores the need to understand which specific governance capabilities drive development and how. This study aims to estimate the effect of government leadership and foresight on national development and to identify the institutional channels through which this effect is transmitted. Drawing on the Chandler Good Government Index merged with World Bank and UNDP indicators, the analysis employs pooled OLS with year fixed effects, mediation analysis with bootstrap inference, and a comprehensive set of robustness tests on an unbalanced panel of 120 countries over 2021–2025. Leadership and foresight are positively and significantly associated with GDP per capita, life expectancy, and the Human Development Index (β = 4.049, p < 0.01 for ln GDP per capita; a one-standard-deviation increase corresponds to a 79% increase in GDP). The mediation analysis – the study’s central contribution – reveals that 152.1% of the total effect is transmitted indirectly through other governance capabilities, principally robust laws (157.4%), strong institutions (137.6%), and attractive marketplace (133.4%), while the direct residual effect is negative (β = −2.110, p < 0.01), indicating a “vision–capacity gap.” The effect is significant only in high-income economies (β = 1.506, p < 0.01) and absent in lower-income contexts. These findings demonstrate that leadership functions as a meta-governance capability whose developmental impact is channeled through, rather than independent of, the broader institutional architecture.