Azer Babayev

There are active debates on the scale of inflation-economic growth causality in the short- and long-term perspectives and factors affecting the correlation and effectiveness of anti-inflationary measures depending on initial economic conditions. These scientific debates result in controversial results. This study aims to explore short- and long-run relationships in the inflation-economic growth chain of 12 post-Soviet countries (Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia) to determine the most effective system of anti-inflationary policy. The paper employed statistical analysis and trend line extrapolation (analysis of inflationary trends in 2000–2021 and forecast for 2022–2024), pooled mean group of the autoregressive distributed lag model in the Stata 14.2/SE software (identification of the short and long-run coefficients characterizing relationships between inflation and economic growth), and ordinary least squares regression (country-specific modeling results). Statistical analysis showed that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have the most effective anti-inflationary policy; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova demonstrate moderate effectiveness, and the other countries have low effectiveness. It is also established that in the long run, a 1% increase in inflation results in a 0.195% decrease in GDP growth with a 99% confidence probability, while in the short run, this causal relationship is insignificant. Country-specific modeling results revealed that within 12 post-Soviet countries, economic growth in Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Ukraine in a short-term perspective depends on inflation dynamics. According to the modeling results, Lithuania has the most effective anti-inflationary policy to ensure sustainable economic growth.

Ensuring price stability is a dominant function of the central bank. Empirical studies on various statistical samples give conflicting results regarding the influence of central bank independence on the inflation rate. The study offers a methodology for assessing the role of the formation of a national pattern of central bank independence in ensuring price stability. Calculations were made for 53 countries of the world using a combination of cluster analysis tools and panel regression modeling. The cluster analysis carried out at different time intervals of the study allowed defining three patterns of the formation of central bank independence. The changes in the clusters characterizing the peculiarities of the national patterns of central bank independence shows that for a number of countries there is no stable national pattern. Modeling based on panel data showed that when forming a country pattern “Limited level of central bank independence”, an increase in the level of independence of the central bank by one unit on average leads to an increase in the inflation rate by 7.09%. On the other hand, in the countries with the national patterns of central bank independence “Dominance of the institutional and financial component of ensuring the independence of the central bank” and “Dominance of the personal and functional component of ensuring the independence of the central bank”, the expected consequence of increasing the level of independence of the central bank by one unit is to reduce the inflation rate by an average of 3.32% and 6.03%, respectively.

Local and global financial crises are caused by a wide range of geopolitical, macro-financial, and socio-economic determinants. The purpose of this study is to assess the role of central bank independence in preventing financial crises and mitigating their consequences. Two hypotheses were tested. A measure of the banking regulator independence is the CWN index of the central bank independence. The hypotheses were tested on data from 53 countries suffering from financial crises over the last 40 years (the sample includes both developed and developing countries from different continents). The tools of nonlinear logit regression (modeling the probability of loss of financial stability due to a financial crisis, considering different levels of the banking regulator independence) and panel regression with random effects (modeling the influence of the banking regulator independence on banking activities during crisis periods) were used for calculations. The study did not confirm that a high level of central bank independence is a necessary condition for preventing the occurrence of financial crises in the national economy. On the contrary, the likelihood of financial instability was found to be higher in countries with more independent central banks. Thus, during crisis periods, an increase in the CWN index by 1 ensures an increase in the regulatory capital adequacy parameter by an average of 0.28%, a decrease in return on assets by 0.59%, and an increase in the share of non-performing loans by 1.69%.