Do institutional investors in the UK substitute the board in firm monitoring? Implications for audit quality
-
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.22(2).2025.32
-
Article InfoVolume 22 2025, Issue #2, pp. 411-421
- 37 Views
-
16 Downloads
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This study examines whether institutional investors in the UK substitute the board in firm monitoring and investigates the impact of this substitutive role on audit quality. The methodology comprised a cross-sectional generalized least squares (GLS) random effects model, and a robustness test used the generalized linear model (GLM). The sample included 1,128 firm-year observations and spanned the period 2012–2022. The results suggest a positive relationship between institutional ownership, board size, and audit quality. The interacting variables detect the possibly substitutive role of institutional investors, and the negative coefficient of the interaction term suggests that there are only a few institutional investors on the board. Board independence does not seem to influence audit quality or to be affected by institutional ownership. This finding is attributed to the strictly advisory role of independent board members in the UK market. Overall, the empirical results support the influential role of institutional investors, who replace the board in monitoring and positively influence audit quality.
- Keywords
-
JEL Classification (Paper profile tab)M42, M41, M48
-
References52
-
Tables5
-
Figures0
-
- Table 1. Definition of variables
- Table 2. Descriptive statistics, N = 1,128
- Table 3. Spearman correlation matrix
- Table 4. GLS - Regression equation results
- Table 5. GLM – Regression equation results
-
- Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37(3), 315-342.
- Black, B., Cheffins, B., & Klausner, M. (2005). Liability Risk for Outside Directors: A Cross-Border Analysis. European Financial Management, 11(2), 153-171.
- Cadbury, A. (1992). The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. Gee Publishing.
- Chauhan, Y., Dey, D. K., & Jha, R. R. (2016). Board structure, controlling ownership, and business groups: Evidence from India. Emerging Markets Review, 27, 63-83.
- Chen, T., & Lin, C. (2016). Institutional Ownership, Audit Choices and Quality: Evidence from Russell Index Reconstitutions. SSRN Electronic Journal.
- Choi, J., Kim, J., Liu, X., & Simunic, D. A. (2008). Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross-country Evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(1), 55-99.
- D’Amato, A., & Gallo, A. (2017). Does Bank Institutional Setting Affect Board Effectiveness? Evidence from Cooperative and Joint-Stock Banks. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 25(2), 78-99.
- Davis, J. G., & García-Cestona, M. (2023). Institutional ownership, earnings management and earnings surprises: Evidence from 39 years of U.S. data. Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science, 28(56), 218-236.
- Dey, A. (2008). Corporate Governance and Agency Conflicts. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5), 1143-1181.
- Dong, T., Eugster, F., & Vazquez, A. B. (2024). Passive Investors and Audit Quality: Evidence from the U.S. European Accounting Review, 33(3), 965-993.
- Federo, R., Ponomareva, Y., Aguilera, R. V., Saz-Carranza, A., & Losada, C. (2020). Bringing owners back on board: A review of the role of ownership type in board governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 28(6), 348-371.
- Feldmann, D. A., & Schwarzkopf, D. L. (2003). The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Board and Audit Committee Composition. Review of Accounting and Finance, 2(4), 87-109.
- Fields, L. P., Fraser, D. R., & Wilkins, M. S. (2004). An investigation of the pricing of audit services for financial institutions. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(1), 53-77.
- Financial Reporting Council. (2018). UK Corporate Governance Code.
- FRC. (2018). Guidance on Board Effectiveness. FRC, Financial Reporting Council.
- FRC. (2024). Annual Review of Audit Quality. FRC, Financial Reporting Council.
- Guest, P. M. (2008). The determinants of board size and composition: Evidence from the UK. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(1), 51-72.
- Gujarati, D. N. (2003). Basic Econometrics (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
- Han, S., Kang, T., & Rees, L. (2013). The association between institutional ownership and audit properties. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, 20(2), 199-222.
- Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2008). A Theory of Board Control and Size. Review of Financial Studies, 21(4), 1797-1832.
- Hay, D. (2013). Further Evidence from Meta-Analysis of Audit Fee Research. International Journal of Auditing, 17(2), 162-176.
- Higgs, D. (2003). Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors. UK Department of Trade and Industry.
- Hsu, G. C.-M., & Koh, P.-S. (2005). Does the Presence of Institutional Investors Influence Accruals Management? Evidence from Australia. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(6), 809-823.
- Jaskiewicz, P., & Klein, S. (2007). The impact of goal alignment on board composition and board size in family businesses. Journal of Business Research, 60(10), 1080-1089.
- Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
- Kalia, D., Basu, D., & Kundu, S. (2023). Board characteristics and demand for audit quality: A meta-analysis. Asian Review of Accounting, 31(1), 153-175.
- Kim, J.-B., Pevzner, M., & Xin, X. (2019). Foreign institutional ownership and auditor choice: Evidence from worldwide institutional ownership. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(1), 83-110.
- Klettner, A. (2021). Stewardship Codes and the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: An International Comparison and Typology. British Journal of Management, 32(4), 988-1006.
- Lehn, K. M., Patro, S., & Zhao, M. (2009). Determinants of the Size and Composition of US Corporate Boards: 1935-2000. Financial Management, 38(4), 747-780.
- Li, X., & Liu, M. (2024). Abnormal audit fees and financial reporting quality: A meta-analysis. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 55, 100622.
- Lin, L. (2016). Institutional ownership composition and accounting conservatism. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 46(2), 359-385.
- Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance. The Business Lawyer, 48(1), 59-77.
- Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 406-429.
- Mitra, S., & Cready, W. M. (2005). Institutional Stock Ownership, Accrual Management, and Information Environment. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 20(3), 257-286.
- Munisi, G., Hermes, N., & Randøy, T. (2014). Corporate boards and ownership structure: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. International Business Review, 23(4), 785-796.
- Musteen, M., Datta, D. K., & Kemmerer, B. (2010). Corporate Reputation: Do Board Characteristics Matter? British Journal of Management, 21(2), 498-510.
- Myners, P. (2001). Institutional investment in the United Kingdom: A review (Report to HM Treasury).
- Nehme, R., & Jizi, M. (2018). The efficiency of corporate boards and firms’ audit fees: The case of the FTSE financial institutions. Pacific Accounting Review, 30(3), 297-317.
- OECD. (2023). Institutional shareholding, common ownership and productivity: A cross-country analysis (OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 1769; OECD Economics Department Working Papers, Vol. 1769).
- O’Sullivan, N. (2000). The impact of board composition and ownership on audit quality: Evidence from large UK companies. The British Accounting Review, 32(4), 397-414.
- Ozkan, N. (2007). Do corporate governance mechanisms influence CEO compensation? An empirical investigation of UK companies. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 17(5), 349-364.
- Raheja, C. G. (2005). Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40(2), 283-306.
- Schmidt, C., & Fahlenbrach, R. (2017). Do exogenous changes in passive institutional ownership affect corporate governance and firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 124(2), 285-306.
- Seetharaman, A., Gul, F. A., & Lynn, S. G. (2002). Litigation risk and audit fees: Evidence from UK firms cross-listed on US markets. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(1), 91-115.
- Srinidhi, B. N., & Gul, F. A. (2007). The Differential Effects of Auditors’ Nonaudit and Audit Fees on Accrual Quality. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(2), 595-629.
- The IA. (2023). Investment Management in the UK 2022-2023 (Annual Survey). The Investment Association.
- UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. (2022). Restoring trust in audit and corporate governance. Government response to the consultation on strengthening the UK’s audit, corporate reporting and corporate governance systems. Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.
- Velte, P. (2024). Institutional ownership and board governance. A structured literature review on the heterogeneous monitoring role of institutional investors. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 24(2), 225-263.
- Wang, M. (2014). Which Types of Institutional Investors Constrain Abnormal Accruals? Corporate Governance: An International Review, 22(1), 43-67.
- Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.
- Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334.
- Zhong, L., Chourou, L., & Ni, Y. (2017). On the association between strategic institutional ownership and earnings quality: Does investor protection strength matter? Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 36(6), 429-450.