A moral hazard perspective on financial crisis

  • Received January 24, 2017;
    Accepted July 3, 2017;
    Published November 2, 2017
  • Author(s)
  • DOI
  • Article Info
    Volume 12 2017, Issue #3, pp. 298-307
  • Cited by
    3 articles

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Moral hazard is a typical problem of modern economic system, if we consider its a central role in the events leading up to the (financial) crisis of 2008. Therefore, there is a need to better appreciate its nature and its role, if future reforms are to be well designed in order to prevent further crises, default, bankrupt, down the line. Along this perspective, the paper discusses a moral hazard perspective on recent financial crisis, from Enron bankruptcy, to Lehman case, through AIG, Bearn Stern, Citigroup bail out, commenting, eventually, selected rules contained in the Sarbanes Oxley Act issued by the U.S. Government in 2002. The paper, next, comments on recent crisis of four Italian banks and on the bail in recently introduced for European banks. Eventually, the paper focuses on the so-called “free-rider” problem, discussing pro and cons of selected financial instruments (e.g. credit derivatives), while offering from a technical standpoint with the help of an analytical approach.

view full abstract hide full abstract