Effective decisions for individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises: the features of the game theory application


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The conditions for doing business at this stage are often similar in a game in which you need to calculate your actions a few steps ahead. At the same time, it is important to highlight several possible current options and make the necessary decision at the control moment. Moreover, each of the options formed should be justified, understandable and take into account the risk factors and available resources.
Today, the main problem of assessing and minimizing the risk of “unfriendly takeover” is due to the fact that in most cases the raider is a player who acts quite legitimately and relies on the loopholes of the current legislative framework. Therefore, it is easier to identify possible actions of the raider and to avoid them within the limits of the reverse game than to deal with the consequences.
The purpose of the research is to study the specificity of the individualized assessment and minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” by using elements of game theory.
It has been taken into account that the effect of individualization in assessing the risk of unfriendly takeover of enterprises can possibly be achieved on the basis of the application of game theory, the elements of which provide simulation of the unfriendly takeover process within the mathematical description of the inherent combinations of attack/defence as if they actually occurred in time both within one state of the external environment and for their given set.
The results allowed forming mathematical decision-making models based on the elements of the antagonistic game “raider-target enterprise” and “raider games with the external environment”, which proved the possibility to: 1) identify possible functions of wins/losses; 2) combinations of attacks that can be neglected (that is, from the point of view of the rationality of decisions, will be rejected by the raider); 3) the ranking of the raider’s “attack combinations” for the reliability of their use during “unfriendly takeover”. Under such conditions, the target company can provide not only a detailed assessment, but also an effective minimization of the risk of “unfriendly takeover” and allocate the best combination of protection.

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    • Figure 1. Algorithm of individualized estimation and minimization of risks of unfriendly takeovers of the enterprise
    • Table 1. Payment matrix of LLC “TENT TRANS” – PJSC “Transcarpathia Auto”, based on the actions of the raider B1, thousand UAH
    • Table 2. Aggregated payment matrix of LLC “TENT TRANS” – PJSC “Transcarpathia Auto”, thousand UAH
    • Table 3. The results of the estimation of the attack combinations of LLC “TENT TRANS” according to the probability of use during hostile takeover, thousand UAH