Prasojo 
                    
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                The relationship between risk-taking and maqasid shariah-based performance in Islamic banks: Does shariah governance matter?Prasojo , 
    Winwin Yadiati , 
    Winwin Yadiati , 
    Tettet Fitrijanti , 
    Tettet Fitrijanti , 
    Memed Sueb , 
    Memed Sueb doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.17(1).2022.12 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.17(1).2022.12A dearth of studies linking risk-taking with maqasid shariah-based performance has been the motivation for analyzing this relationship. This study also examines the moderating effect of shariah governance. The study uses time-series data with the dynamic panel technique to examine the relationship between variables. The number of samples in this study was 75 Islamic banks operating non-window banking from 19 countries. Results prove that risk-taking has a significant adverse effect on the performance of Islamic banks. Lower risk-taking indicates a bank is more efficient, resulting in higher maqashid shariah-based performance. The governance has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between risk-taking and the performance of Islamic banks. Increasingly quality SSB strengthens the risk-taking relationship with maqashid shariah-based performance. This study implies that Islamic banks with quality SSB will be more efficient in managing risk to increase performance that complies with maqashid shariah criteria in the long term. This study concludes that managers must improve risk management in the distribution of funds so that Islamic banks are more efficient. Furthermore, policy-making authorities in each country must support the policy on the existence of SSB and the composition of the background so that it is of higher quality. 
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                The effect of shariah board characteristics, risk-taking, and maqasid shariah on an Islamic bank’s performanceMemed Sueb , 
    Prasojo , 
    Prasojo , 
    Muhfiatun , 
    Muhfiatun , 
    Lailatis Syarifah , 
    Lailatis Syarifah , 
    Rosyid Nur Anggara Putra , 
    Rosyid Nur Anggara Putra doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.17(3).2022.08 				
                            Banks and Bank Systems Volume 17, 2022 Issue #3 pp. 89-101 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.17(3).2022.08 				
                            Banks and Bank Systems Volume 17, 2022 Issue #3 pp. 89-101
 Views: 1998 Downloads: 747 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯShariah supervisory boards are a key feature of shariah governance (SG), providing additional monitoring and oversight. A suitable SG mechanism enhances risk mitigation and improves Islamic bank (IB) performance without violating shariah principles. This study examines the impact of the shariah supervisory board (SSB), maqasid shariah, and risk-taking on Islamic bank performance globally. Quantitative research design with a Dynamic panel regression approach is used with a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) with data from the Bankscope database for 2014–2018. The findings of this study show that characteristics of SSB and risk-taking have a significant impact on IB performance. This study proves that higher SSB characteristics in terms of size, expertise, level of education, cross-membership and reputation encourage the better performance of Islamic banks. Higher risk-taking illustrates that Islamic banks are more efficient, resulting in better financial performance. Compliance with maqasid sharia indicates that sharia banks comply with Islamic laws so that the resulting performance meets financial aspects and sharia principles. SSB functions as a monitor for Islamic banks so that they operate according to sharia principles, which are reflected in the maqasid sharia elements. Therefore, a higher quality SSB and a higher maqasid shariah index score positively affect the financial performance of IBs. 
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                Shariah governance effects on cash holdings under sustainability commitments: Indonesian Islamic banksTettet Fitrijanti , 
    Prasojo , 
    Prasojo , 
    Nunuy Nur Afiah , 
    Nunuy Nur Afiah , 
    Sofyan Hadinata , 
    Sofyan Hadinata doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.20(4).2025.02 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.20(4).2025.02Type of the article: Research Article Abstract 
 This study investigates the link between sustainability commitment and cash holdings and assesses the relationship between board meetings (BM), industry knowledge (IK), and Shariah Supervisory Boards (SSBs) and sustainability commitment in Indonesian Islamic banks. The analysis employs entity-year fixed effects regressions and conducts robustness checks on an unbalanced panel covering 15 banks from 2017 to 2023. Sustainability commitment is proxied by a disclosure index aligned with national and global guidelines, while cash holdings equal cash and equivalents scaled by total assets.
 Results from the main specification indicate that stronger sustainability commitment is associated with higher cash holdings (p < 0.05), consistent with precautionary motives under ESG execution and disclosure scrutiny. Board activity, proxied by meeting frequency, is positively related to sustainability commitment (p < 0.01), and SSB size also shows a significant association (p < 0.01). Leadership competency is not a significant factor in the sustainability liquidity link. While standard controls are included, bank age is negatively associated with cash holdings (p < 0.01).
 These findings suggest that banks with stronger sustainability commitment maintain larger liquidity buffers, and that SSB oversight and active boards help embed sustainability within prudential liquidity management. The evidence informs regulators and managers seeking to coordinate Shariah governance, sustainability mandates, and cautious liquidity practices in emerging markets.Acknowledgment 
 Currently, the manuscript is under the support of The Academic Research Grant (ALG), which is an Internal Research Grant from Unpad (Padjadjaran University) for the year 2023 with reference number 1549/UN6.3.1/PT.00/2023.
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