Banking crises and financial instability: Empirical and historical lessons

The size of the public sector is an important tool in public governance. Public sector size may fuel both economic growth and political influence over the economy.
By compiling and processing data from different sources of public accounts the paper aims at mapping the development of key financial indicators for the Norwegian central government sector during the transition period from the mid 19th to the mid 20th century. The data enable us to give measures of the size of the public sector alone and compared to the overall economy.
It is found that the sector started its continuous growth before politicians deliberately started to increase the sector’s size of the total economy. The paper also finds that an increase of the public sector often, but not always, reflects political economy regimes. Persistent growth in public finances as a tool for economic policy making did not take place before the introduction of the social-democratic regime in 1935.
The paper also concludes that economic growth started before the growth in the public sector, suggesting that public sector growth might as well be a result of economic growth or vice versa.

This paper deals with relationships between puritanism, management and entrepreneurship. As this is an on-going debate among economic historians, it focuses on the period from the early 1800s until present times, where Norwegian high profile puritan entrepreneurship serves as the case.
The theoretical framework is that entrepreneurship is seen as an important liaison factor representing multifactor productivity in a Solow growth model. The paper provides new insight within different areas on the basis of utilization of available sources. Firstly, it gives new estimates of the entrepreneurship of the puritan leader, Hans Nielsen Hauge (1771–1824).
Secondly, it organizes his followers in three generations. The first is those who directly took up his heritage, i.e. Haugeans. Their heydays lasted until the middle of the 19th century. The second generation is characterized as Haugean descendants. These were highly influenced by the movement’s values. They dominated the scene from the late 1800s to the late 1900s. The third generation is called Neo-Haugeans, largely a fruit of the revival of Haugean values during the last decades.
Thirdly, the paper maps attributes and motivation of this puritan entrepreneurship during generations. The authors conclude that it was guided by high degree of innovation, family ownership, wide portfolios, and continuity, when stewardship seems to be an important motivational factor.

This paper sheds light on the financial crisis of 2008–2010 in eleven emerging Eastern European economies (EE11): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan and Ukraine. The aim is twofold. In the first place it seeks to find out if the financial instability hypothesis, as put forward by Minsky and Kindleberger, is a valid explanatory factor for the crisis. Secondly, it tries to map if general institutional frameworks of these countries were developed in order to stand against the factors leading into the financial crisis.
To answer these research problems the paper maps cycles of three parameters representing the real economy, i.e. gross domestic product, manufacturing output and unemployment and four parameters representing the financial markets, i.e. money supply, credit volumes, inflation and government debt. The cycle approach is carried out with the help of a structural time series analysis to isolate cycles in time series. The paper concludes that there were substantial positive financial cycles previous to the financial crisis mirrored by similar cycles in the real economy.
Similarly, the results show negative cycles in the same parameters during the years of crisis. It seems that an uncontrolled increase in money and credit caused the economy to overheat and thereafter contract into financial and real economy crises.
Also, the paper compiles twelve different indices of institutional development. These are standardized and presented in an institutional development matrix, showing that the general institutional framework for the eleven economies was weak previous to and under the meltdown of the economies.
The construction of an integrated institutional development index on the basis of the same twelve parameters confirms institutional shortcomings, which may have made the economies less able to guard themselves from a crisis initiated by both domestically and internationally financial instability.