Rusmin Rusmin

This paper examines whether family-controlled and financially healthy firms practice earnings management. The data collection focuses on non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the fiscal year 2017–2019. Family and financially healthy firms are key predictor variables for predicting earnings management behavior. Jones’s (1991) modified cross-sectional model measures discretionary accruals (the earnings management indicator). This study reveals a negative relationship between family entities and earnings management practices, suggesting that family-controlled firms are more likely to report a higher quality of earnings. This study also documents that family entities with financial difficulties have more incentive to practice earnings management. Additionally, the study indicates that the involvement of a family member in executive positions leads to lower financial reporting quality. Finally, this study reports a nonlinearity association between family share ownership and the magnitude of earnings management. The study’s findings may assist policymakers in considering the costs and benefits associated with various levels of ownership concentration, especially in the hands of family members.

There is a growing concern about environmental issues, particularly carbon emissions, in many countries. Indonesia, with its huge population, also suffers from excessive carbon emissions. This study aims to investigate the effect of family businesses on environmental performance, specifically carbon emission disclosure. This study also explores the role of the family supervisory board and management on the quality of carbon emission disclosure. The study employed 62 non-financial family-listed firms in 2017–2019 (186 observations). The analysis found a positive and significant relationship between family enterprises and the disclosure of carbon emissions, implying that family firms expose more information about their carbon emissions. It also revealed a significant positive association between the family supervisory board and carbon emission performance, suggesting that having family members on the supervisory board aligns with policies for reducing and maintaining accountability for carbon emissions. In summary, the findings suggest that family enterprises prefer to exercise their indirect control by holding a position on the supervisory board and owning a substantial percentage of the company’s stock corresponding to their socio-emotional wealth agenda. Additionally, there is a non-linear association between family firms and the disclosure of carbon emissions. Carbon emission performance decreases as family share ownership rises to 53.1% but increases when family equity exceeds this cut-off point. Finally, family shareholders in non-polluted firms report higher quality of carbon emission disclosure.